

Peer Review

Review of: "The Hard Problems of AI"

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The author argues that debates surrounding whether AI possesses consciousness, agency, and other related attributes—referred to as the hard problems of AI—engage with pseudo-problems. These debates, according to the author, presuppose the existence of necessary and sufficient conditions for entities to qualify as mentally qualitative beings. However, the author contends that determining whether entities are conscious or agents is ultimately a matter of modeling their behaviors within frameworks under which their actions appropriately fall. I believe this paper addresses an important question and presents an argument that could be valuable to both proponents and critics of the author's position.

While I find the author's conclusion regarding consciousness compelling, I think the paper could benefit from engaging with recent experimental philosophy research. For instance, Sytsma and Ozdemir's 2019 paper, "No Problem: Evidence that the Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness is Not Widespread," argues that, unlike philosophers, ordinary people tend to use the term "consciousness" in a non-phenomenal and functional sense. This perspective may align with or enrich the author's proposal for conceptual engineering as a pragmatic approach to addressing AI consciousness. Furthermore, the ordinary usage of "consciousness" may already carry the pragmatic sense that the author advocates for, which could strengthen their argument.

Declarations

Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.