

Review of: "How to Amend Christian List's Theory on Free Will to Answer the Challenge from Indeterminism"

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The paper 'How to Amend Christian List's Theory on Free Will to Answer the Challenge from Indeterminism' makes an important contribution to the evaluation of Christian List's compatibilist libertarianism. It shows that even if agential indeterminism at a higher level is possible given physical determinism at a lower level, it is not by itself sufficient to secure agential control. I understand the dialectic of Ville Kokko's argument as follows: Let's assume, following List, that ontology is structured into a higher and a lower level, and at the higher level, there exist indeterministic agential possibilities. This assumption introduces the problem of luck, a classical challenge for libertarians, which Kokko characterizes as 'the challenge from indeterminism'. For compatibilist libertarianism to be preferred over traditional compatibilist and libertarian alternatives, it must address this problem.

List & Rabinowicz (2014) propose a solution to this problem through the agent's intentional endorsement of their own choice. However, how does the agent endorse one of the agentially accessible options? Kokko summarizes their answer: "The possibility of doing otherwise is satisfied by there being, at the moment of a choice, several possible futures that the agent could choose by their actions. The requirement of endorsement is satisfied by their being, separately from this, some kind of an *endorsement function* that tells which of the options the agent will endorse." However, the luck problem reemerges: Is the endorsement function deterministic or indeterministic? If deterministic, the agent lacks alternative possibilities at the agential level (because all agent-level facts determine the choice), so the fact that there are agential possibilities metaphysically accessible to the agent does not make them accessible in the sense required for free will and moral responsibility. I agree with Kokko that if the deterministic option is chosen, it poses a problem for compatibilist libertarians. Of course, this problem can be solved: there are possible answers to this classical objection of determinism. However, all such answers are also available to classical compatibilist theories that do not require a layered ontology and two types of possibilities, agential and physical, so it is not clear what benefit the introduction of agential possibilities brings. But if the endorsement function is indeterministic, the initial problem of luck reappears, as the agent again loses control over the outcome of her deliberation (what result her endorsement function yields).

Kokko proposes a way forward for compatibilist libertarianism: to introduce a distinction between the level of agential possibilities (the level involving the options), which must be indeterministic, and the level involving the choice/endorsement function, which must be deterministic. This arrangement would allow the agent to have real possibilities metaphysically open to her, but the choice among these options would deterministically depend on the totality of the agent's psychological characteristics. This would presumably grant the agent both libertarian-style alternative

possibilities and luck-free control.

My question regarding this solution is: what reason do we have to believe that there are two agential levels, rather than one, which differ from each other in such a drastic way—one being deterministic and the other indeterministic? If this question can be answered satisfactorily, then compatibilist libertarianism can address the luck objection as proposed by Ville Kokko. Otherwise, Christian List and other proponents of compatibilist libertarianism should provide a different response to this version of the luck objection. In any case, the paper advances the discussion and deserves publication.