

# Review of: "Richir's Phenomenological and Symbolical as a Model for the Relationship between Phenomenology and Theology"

Erond L. Damanik<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Universitas Negeri Medan

Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

Thank you for trusting me to review this interesting article. This article focuses on "quasi theology" in bridging phenomenological and symbolic relationships. The main argument emphasized in the subreptitious crossover from one discipline to another is the overlap between phenomenology and symbolism to explore the mutual transformation of the two. Furthermore, this paper concludes that experience is the immanent foundation of phenomenology and theology where Richir's approach is understood as metaphysical phenomenology. The assumptions and conclusions above depart from the main question: how does theology invite phenomenology to meaning and praxis and how does phenomenology, through its linguistic phenomena, become a tool of theological innovation.

On the point of conclusion, the author emphasized; "We have already seen the above intuition in Richir's phenomenology. The phenomenological and the symbolic are essentially aspects of the same human experience. The ideas proposed by Reason (the symbolical) in their determination, become essentially humanized when they incite phenomenalisation that temporalizes and spatializes human experience. The power of imagination in its liberality (the phenomenological) while seeking to surpass itself still remains within the zone of human experience, insofar as it merely stretches in its strides to apprehend." At this point, I want to emphasize that, phenomenological and symbolic, although departing from human experience, however, the two cannot be equated, phenomenological is seeing phenomena or symptoms. Likewise symbolic, still a symbol. The two phenomena and symbols are different. Phenomenon is a symptom, but symbolic is not necessarily a phenomenon. How does the Author explain this?

Furthermore, this statement; "The relationships are overlapping as we have shown. The consequence: purely theologically symbolic cannot exist in the same way that there cannot be purely immanent phenomenology. Until this statement, I agree that purely theologically symbolic is not the same as purely immanent phenomenology. This statement, actually, there is no need to argue that the two are clearly different. However, I would like to criticize this statement: " In the end, what we have in Richir's thought can be equated, following Hegel's Phenomenology of the Spirit, with metaphysical phenomenology. My comment, how to review a phenomenon, say it like that, is included in metaphysical phenomenology or phenomenology of spirit?

This conclusion statement also; "In this section making allusions to the metaphysics behind the appearance of Heidegger's phenomenology, we also see in Richir's phenomenology the dependence of phenomenal ("open structure at

play") on metaphysical instances (Being, God) —a tendency which permeated the later development of Richir's phenomenology." My comment, if this statement is reiterated by the author, as if, Richir and Heidegger contradict each other, why does the writer conclude that Richir is a metaphysical phenomenology.

Finally, although both depart from experience, they remain an immanent foundation for phenomenology and theology, is "quasi theology" the same as "metaphysical phenomenology" as written in the abstract. Actually, I hope the author writes this paper by making assumptions or real life examples to reinforce the aims and objectives of the two scholars being compared especially in drawing conclusions.