

Review of: "Either you know or you've gotta believe"

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This is a well-written paper on the relation between knowledge and belief. The author argues against the predominant contemporary view that knowledge entails belief (entailment thesis) and for the thesis that knowledge and belief are two distinct, independent and mutually exclusive notions. The main difference, according to the author, consists in the requirement for action: knowledge does not require action, but belief does. Therefore, belief is more complex than knowledge.

In the following some points which are not quite clear to me yet:

1. There are also cases where we act on our knowledge. The author acknowledges this but claims that acting on knowledge is different from acting on our (current) beliefs. She takes an example from Ramsey which concerns what we could call low-grade or maybe even background knowledge (knowing where something is located). According to the author, we act habitually on our knowledge, we do not have to properly think about it. With belief, however, we are fully aware and conscious of the belief we act upon.

I am not sure if this difference always holds (to this extent). It would be interesting to know how that difference looks like with more demanding forms of knowledge or low-grade knowledge that we are fully aware of while acting.

For example, if I want to dismantle a bomb and I know that cutting the red wire will lead to explosion, I take proper care to not cut the red wire. This might be a case where I consciously and in full awareness act on my knowledge.

Or imagine a climate scientist who knows a lot of complex facts about global warming. Based on this knowledge she develops measures to slow down global warming. This action (developing measures) is certainly not habitual but consciously based on her knowledge.

Or is the point rather that sometimes we can act habitually on our knowledge whereas we can never act habitually on our beliefs?

However, one could also imagine situations where we've formed a belief over time and now habitually act according to it (e. g. superstition: I believe that every time a cat, coming from the left, crosses the street, it's going to rain -> so I automatically take an umbrella with me on these occasions without thinking about this action).

2. A basic thought about complexity: is it sufficient to show that belief requires action (alongside other conditions) and that knowledge does not, in order to claim that belief is more complex? There might be lots of conditions needed for belief

(action, awareness, etc.) which are not needed for knowledge. However, there might also be conditions needed for knowledge (e. g. truth) that are not needed for belief. Would it not be necessary to show that the conditions for knowledge are overall less (or less demanding, less differentiated,...) than the conditions for belief?

3. Does the author take any stance regarding the superiority of knowledge (or belief)? Is knowledge still 'better' than belief (because it's factive) or should we value belief more because of its connection to action (or because of other reasons)? Or should we not make this comparison in the first place?

4. Lastly, a formal point: double-checking the page numbers of the quotations would be good (I've noticed that at least Antognazza's article has a different pagination).

These are just some suggestions which might help improve the paper. Overall, I think the paper addresses an important topic in questioning the (still) standard JTB view in contemporary epistemology and presents a very relevant contribution to the debate.