

Review of: "Growing Confidence and Remaining Uncertainty About Animal Consciousness"

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This article raises an exciting topic about animal consciousness. Let me raise some questions on the topic from a neuroscience view of the human animal. Concerning "The Definitional Problem", we can accept as good that consciousness is "the process by which an animal has perceptual and affective experience or feelings, arising from the material substrate of a nervous system" (Irwin et al., 2022). However, it should be clear that biologically consciousness is a state of consciousness that in simple terms means realizing. When we are not conscious, we are unconscious (sleep, anesthesia, coma). It is neurobiologically questionable to identify consciousness with perception, understanding, processing of information, thoughts, memories, working memory, planning, attention, feelings, sensations, decision-making, volitional activity, sense of self, and other terms. All these terms respond to other functions that occur consciously. We may be aware of everything previously expressed, but they are different entities due to their production mechanism. What is surprising is that when we are conscious we are simultaneously unconscious with respect to much of the somatic, cognitive and sensory-emotional neurological processing. It is one thing to be aware of and another for a mental operation to be conscious or unconscious. Conscious and unconscious neurological processing or functioning are continuously happening in the human animal, and it is reasonable to think that in all its forms in the majority of living beings from a certain complexity.

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