Elvio Fachinelli — Psychoanalysis of Dissension in Italy

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Abstract

I recently wrote a chapter on the book *The Years of Alienation in Italy* (Barbetta, 2019) focusing on the persona of Elvio Fachinelli (1928-1989). In this essay, I will outline Fachinelli’s thought and clinical practice from the 1960s to the 1980s, up until his premature death at 61, in 1989. Fachinelli was a prominent exponent of the critical psychoanalysis in Milan; he was a peculiar type of psychoanalyst, not the kind of person easily to be enrolled or framed into a mainstream – whether it be Freudian or Lacanian. But this is not Fachinelli’s main highlight; during the years following 1968 in Europe, there have been many left-wing dissidents, or libertarians, psychiatrists, psychologists and psychoanalysts: Ronald Laing, Franco Basaglia and Franca Ongaro, Franz Fanon, Felix Guattari, just to mention few.

Fachinelli is important for three main contributions to the field: 1. the way he shaped the connection between psychoanalysis and historical materialism; 2. the issue concerning the possibility of a different kind of psychoanalysis for the working class; and 3. his singular approach concerning what I call corporeal turn in psychotherapy.

The arguments with Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan are at the center of the following essay. The years of Fachinelli’s work have not had the same influence and popularity as Lacan’s in Italy. However, Lacan was interested in involving Fachinelli within his movement, yet Fachinelli refused Lacan’s proposal and advanced theoretical and clinical reasons – that I will mention and analyse in this paper - for such said refusal.

Keywords: Freud, Lacan, Fachinelli, Ferenczi, body, incest, transference.

First psychoanalysts generation diaspora

Elvio Fachinelli was a Medical Doctor who entered the world of psychoanalysis after two years of personal analysis under Cesare Musatti. Musatti was a Philosopher, he continued the foundation of the Psychoanalytic Society in Milan and in Northern Italy, after the Second World War. The original founder of psychoanalysis in Italy, in 1932, was Eduardo Weiss – a Jewish Italo/Austrian Psychiatrist and Psychoanalyst – trained by Paul Federn and under the supervision of Sigmund Freud. Weiss felt the need to include schooled in human and social studies within the Italian psychoanalytical society -
non-medical doctors (Corsa, 2018) - and Musatti was one of them, invited by Weiss, to be a part of the board. In point of fact, Weiss knew very well the precious cultural and philosophical contributions that human studies would usher the psychoanalytic field.

After the introduction of the Racial Laws in Italy, by the fascism, in order to avoid the deportation to Auschwitz, Weiss was forced to exile, and in 1939 he migrated to the USA. During the fascist period, psychoanalysis faded away from the Italian cultural panorama, as well as an amount of other cultural practices and academic disciplines. Particularly from 1938, Italy assisted at the diaspora of many other prominent Jewish psychoanalysts, such as Silvano Arieti (Psychiatrist), Enzo Bonaventura (Philosopher), Vanda Shrenger (Pediatrician). The majority of them fled, either to the US or Israel to avoid deportation to the camps. All of these psychoanalysts became quite important in the field of psychoanalysis in the countries offering them asylum and gave a contribution to psychotherapy: in Arieti’s case, the volume on *Interpretation of Schizophrenia* (Arieti, 1994); in Bonaventura’s, the important book on *Psychoanalysis* (Bonaventura, 2017); not to mention the precious contribution of Wanda Shrenger – Weiss’ wife - in the field of Jungian Analytic Psychology in California (Corsa, 2017). The same Weiss, who established his work in Chicago, wrote important essays on psychodynamics and became a prominent psychoanalyst in the USA (Weiss, 1950).

After the liberation of Italy, and the return of democracy, the psychoanalytic field recovered prestige, and, in Milan, Cesare Musatti became a key figure, founding a school of psychology with Marcello Cesa Bianchi, in the Guastalla Gardens, Milan. As aforementioned, Fachinelli was trained by Musatti who had him in analysis for no longer than a couple of years. Fachinelli declared himself to be a “wild psychoanalyst” (Fachinelli, 2016), but Musatti, who was entrusted by the publisher Bollati with the translation of the Italian standard edition of Freud’s Work (Freud, 1966-1980), also entrusted Elvio Fachinelli and Herma Trettl – Elvio’s wife - with the editing of the Italian version of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud, 1953-1968); without any doubt the most important work ever written by Freud.

Fachinelli belongs to the second generation of Italian psychoanalysts, after World War II; he was bright and ingenious – this was probably the reason for his short and unique analysis – which brought him to be included in the analytical society. Furthermore, he was highly dissident and critical of the mainstream, to the point of fostering a new kind of diaspora that took place in Italy right after 1968: the contamination between psychoanalysis and the social left-wing movement, or, to be precise, between the thought of Sigmund Freud and the one of Karl Marx. Such a social movement in Italy also had other different branches and developments - Franco Basaglia’s democratic psychiatry; new branches of psychotherapy, such as systemic family therapy, that took place in Milan and Rome with Mara Selvini Palazzoli and Luigi Cancrini – that I will not be mentioning.

*The violence of interpretation. L’homme au magnetophone*

Fachinelli was sensitive to the antiauthoritarian movement that was taking place in Milan during the 1960s and 1970s, and being a psychoanalyst - was also part of the anti-psychiatric movement (Basaglia, 2024, Laing, 1972), extending such said movement from the critique of the Asylum (Goffman, 1961) to the mainstream practice of Freudian analysis, mainly to
what is referred to as “Ego-Psychology”.

While the anti-psychiatric movement was directed against the seclusion of patients in asylums and the violation of personal liberties – the *habeas corpus* issue – justified as cure of “mental illness” (Szasz, 1961), Fachinelli found that, in psychoanalysis, there could be a different, and more subtle, violence within the setting and the relationship between the analyst and “the analyzing” (what in English is mainly referred to as “the patient”, or “the client”).

The issue of violence in psychoanalysis is approached in a book written for a publisher founded by he himself and a group of feminists: *L’erba voglio*. In this book (Fachinelli, 1975) - titled *L’uomo col magnetofono* – the author writes about the case of *L’homme au magnetophone* (The man with the tape recorder), an episode that took place in 1967 in Belgium (Abrahams, 1976). A 32-year-old patient, by the name of Jean-Jacques Abrahams, after a long period of psychoanalytic treatment, bursts into his psychoanalyst’s studio carrying a tape-recorder. Out of the blue, Abrahams threatens doctor van Nypelseer - his therapist - and tries to coerce him into repeating, on tape, all the “formulas” uttered during the entire period of analysis between them. Confronted with Nypelseer’s refusal in obliging with the magnetophone, Abrahams – physically stronger than the analyst - secludes the Doctor inside the office, impeding him to get out and even to use the telephone to ask for help. This act goes on until after the end of the session, when Abrahams is neutralized by law enforcement and sent to the psychiatric hospital. Daringly - after being hospitalized - Abrahams escapes and sends the tape to Jean-Paul Sartre. The French philosopher decides to transcribe and publish the violent discussion in the philosophical French Journal *Les Temps Modernes* (Sartre et al., 1969).

The transcription of the altercation appears, in the text, as if it were a theatrical pièce. The publication of the transcription, done through Sartre’s sense of responsibility, goes against the opinion of the psychoanalyst Jean-Baptiste Pontalis and the writer Bernard Pingaud, who both collaborate with *Les Temps Modernes*. Both, Pontalis and Pingaud, take a strong position against what they referred to as an insolent aggression done by Abrahams towards van Nypelseer. In the reported discussion - published on the same issue of the aforementioned transcription - Pingaud accuses Sartre of imitating the dreadful experience of the English and Italian anti-psychiatry - most probably in reference to Ronald Laing’s experiment of Kingsley Hall (Harris, 2012) in London and Franco Basaglia’s liberation of the psychiatric patients in Gorizia and Trieste.

Fifty years later, a group of investigation - which I have been a part of (Conserva, Barbetta, Valtellina, 2017) - rediscovers the issue concerning Abrahams and Van Nypelseer. The investigation comes back to, not just the Belgian-French episodes of 1967-69, but also to the issue concerning *violence of interpretation*, raised up in the aforementioned 1975 Fachinelli’s book *L’uomo col magnetofono* (Fachinelli, 1975).

Why did Fachinelli repropose the Abrahams affair in 1975, nine years after the event? What was his purpose, on the lines of seven years from Sartre’s controversial decision of publishing what was considered, amongst many scholars and practitioners, a burglary, or a violent aggression toward a practitioner? The invitation of the Italian psychoanalyst was to consider the potential violent context of the setting. Psychoanalytic relationships can hide oppression and authoritarianism under the veil of neutrality. The psychoanalytical treatment is described by Fachinelli as an act of compulsive repetition, or coaction, imposed - more than by the analyst per se – by the rules of the Freudian psychoanalytic setting, which provides
a strict system of submission under the thumb of the *supposed-to-know-subject*: the Imperial-Royal (*Imperialregio*) therapist.

**Fachinelli and Lacan: Italy versus France**

Fachinelli’s contribution to reverse psychoanalysis appears to be similar to the French Lacanian proposal. In point of fact, there are similarities between Lacan and Fachinelli, as, for instance, the idea of discussing the *supposed-to-know-subject* position of the therapist. It is well known – and this is not the purpose of my essay – that Lacan broke his connection with the International Association of Psychoanalysis (IPA) for many theoretical, clinical and practice reasons. Lacan was expelled from IPA for violating the rules of setting, particularly the standard rule of the duration of a session: three quarters of an hour, being reduced to one quarter.

Furthermore, Lacan was fascinated by Fachinelli’s dissenting position towards the psychoanalytical mainstream. Fachinelli was not in the enclave of the Lacanian alumni, but he was bright and dissident; he attracted Lacan’s curiosity; both – Lacan and Fachinelli - had a similar geniality and attitude to diverge from the psychoanalytic paradigm.

Lacan invited Fachinelli to be a part of the Lacanian foundation in Italy. Nonetheless, Fachinelli refused to submit to Lacanianism (Sciacchitano, 2014). The story seems to have gone as follows: Lacan and Fachinelli met each other in Milan when the French psychoanalyst came to Italy for a seminar. In front of a group of psychoanalysts (Contri, 1978, Sciacchitano, 2014), Fachinelli developed an argument raised up after the end of Lacan’s prologus. In such a said moment, Lacan addressed Fachinelli, asking him to pose a question, or clarifying something about his speech. Lacan had the aim to involve Fachinelli as part of the Lacanian enterprise - with Giacomo Contri, Muriel Drazien and Armando Verdiglione - what Sciacchitano (Ivi) refers to as the “spaghetti pass”. Unfortunately, Fachinelli refused the proposal to get on board, and the refusal was enacted by him through a strange and apparently boorish gesture: sliding the back-hand under the chin—a typical Italian gesture of indifference (Sciacchitano, Ivi). When Lacan asked what did Fachinelli mean by this, Fachinelli clarified that he was simply repeating the same gesture performed several years earlier by Piero Sraffa - a Cambridge Economist - in front of Ludwig Wittgenstein, after having read the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. The question posed by Sraffa to Wittgenstein, and – after Sraffa – reproposed by Fachinelli to Lacan, was: “what does it mean my gesture – sliding the back-hand under my chin – in a world of pure Language?”.

Fachinelli meant that there is a corporeal-cultural language, which is absolutely relevant for psychoanalysis. What Fachinelli was actually stressing was that the language of the body is local, singular, irreducible to a universal theory of Language. Fachinelli argued that such a gesture – the hand-back shifting under the chin - is not even typical in all of Italy, it is a Neapolitan one, a cultural singularity of a peculiar community. Communities have different and variable body-languages; however, this does not only involve the body as a whole, this also involves the organs of the body: the sound of the voice, the accent, the scream, the dialect, the chant, etc. Lacan’s answer to Fachinelli’s gesture was immediate. More or less, it went as follows: “Oh my dear, you know that body is the main obstacle to love”.

Such controversy, concerning the body, consumes the difference between Fachinelli and Lacan. We have to bear in mind
that during Fachinelli’s era, the Italian cultural life was intensely influenced by the key intellectual figure of Pier Paolo Pasolini (2005), who re-evaluated Italian dialects as part of the Italian language and culture. I am convinced that such said controversy is plenty connected to the difference between the Italian and the French language.

For many reasons – the centrality of Paris, the imperial-colonial grandiosity of France, the almost absent presence of dialectal forms throughout the country – French Langue is quite unique, with few variations, compared to the Italian languages. Of course, in French language there are differences, however the main differences are between French spoken in France and colonial French (Fanon, 2021). However, there is never a wide difference as amongst the Italian dialectical forms. Italian language is fragmented into a myriad of sub-languages, reciprocally incomprehensible to one another, two Italians, from two different villages, even close in proximity, might find it hard to understand each other. All around Italy, both North and South, there are specific dialects and linguistic minorities.

In my opinion, the Lacan-Fachinelli controversy belongs to the shape of these two – apparently similar, but enormously different - neo-Latin languages. Lacan-Fachinelli controversy is not just a theoretical issue, it is a concrete connection between the way of talking and the way of thinking, between the high noble culture of France and the vernacular Italian one; or between a central Empire and a rabble of different, even struggling-one-against-the-other, communities. Not only did Fachinelli speak both Italian and French on a mother tongue level, he also spoke a type of old German belonging to his village of birth – Luserna. If one excludes Tuscany, the linguistic fragmentation is the usual condition of Italian people. To use the notorious Lacanian theory of the three registers, one might say: France is a Symbolic country, Italy dwells in-between the Imaginary and the Real.

Another controversy: anthropology versus psychoanalysis

Fachinelli returns on the controversy between him and Lacan in different essays. Particularly in one of the chapters of his last book (Fachinelli, 1989) La mente estatica (The Ecstatic Mind); a book that announces his final days of life and the disease that brought him to death the same year of the book publication, 1989. In the chapter titled Lacan and the Thing (Lacan e la Cosa) of La mente estatica, Fachinelli (Ivi) stresses the problem of Lacan’s limits – I would say the Lacanian cut – as “interdiction of incest with the mother”, what in psychoanalysis is referred to as “primary castration”. In Lacan’s theory a bar is represented as a line over the subject, indicating the barred subject – as in the graph $. The bar is a point of arrival – the Symbolic Order - over which it is impossible to advance without avoiding the entrance into the psychotic dominion, the Thing.

One can contemplate the Thing, in the arts, or in religion, the so-called *sub-lime* – lies just one step behind the Thing. Nonetheless entering into the Thing is psychosis. The bar seems equivalent to the mirror (Lacan, 2001), one can watch oneself in the mirror, but one cannot go through the looking glass (Carroll, 2011), and pass into the world of “the Other” without paying the price of madness – as for example the voices experience in schizophrenia, or the sensation of being out of oneself.
In the Lacanian theory of the three registers – the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic – the Real is a none-position, so thick that it is impossible survive, it is the absolute confusion of everything with everything else; the Imaginary is represented by the mirror stadium (Lacan, Ivi), it is the moment of Self-recognition by the child, the first moment of jubilation (jouissance); the Symbolic Order is the realm of Language, conceived as a razor, a structure that makes distinctions and differences; the razor of language is, in theory, what the cut is in clinical practice. The so-called primary process – the primary castration, in Lacanian terms - is not - as in the previous interpretations of Freud – just the consequence of the father’s interdict to the son [sic!] of desiring the mother, as in Freudian stance, it is – in a more linguistic-structural sense - the emergence of the Symbolic Order: i.e., Language.

It is Language – what linguistic-structural theory calls Langue versus Parole - that exercises the primary castrative function, not the father, as a person, but the Name-of-the-Father, as a linguistic structure of the unconscious, the emergence of the dominion of Law. For Lacan - or at least according to one of the versions, or for a period, of Lacan’s taught - “the unconscious is structured as a Language”. The line, over the sign S, means that the subject has a limit in its (her/his) possibility to be complete. As in the Lacanian theory, so in Lacanian clinical practice, the “desire of the analyst” is to insert a cut during the session, which temporarily stops, or breaks, the encounter, whenever it happens, in a variable amount of time, possibly shorter than the supposed Freudian (IPA) analytical standard time of 45 minutes - the famous “Lacanian quarter”.

As far as I understand, Fachinelli’s disquisition toward Lacan, is that the Lacanian cut, during the session, is connected to the bar over the S, the $. The cut during the session – or the bar over the S in theory – has the purpose of interdicting the incestuous connection to the mother/se-duction of the analyst. In this perspective, Lacan’s conceptualization – though in structural-linguistic terms - is not so different from the Freudian Oedipalization (Deleuze, Guattari, 2009). In Freudian Oedipus, the father interdicts the child’s desire towards the mother, in the structural-linguistic Lacanian version this interdiction derives from the Law, which appears when the Name-of-the-Father comes out from the Symbolic Order. The constituted subject, the $, is manque a être, a missing being, the line over S is the graph which represents such a lack.

In this regard, the psychoanalysis of Fachinelli is quite different from the one of Lacan. Fachinelli envisages something connected to the potential-infinite concept in mathematics, namely the asymptotic approximation never-ever completely reaching the point. Such approximation is – in psychoanalysis – desire: the never-ever reaching point of the “Great Mother”, a never-ending movement towards an imaginary being, which has nothing to do with the interdiction of incest. Here Fachinelli’s vision has a commonality with Jung (Fachinelli, 1989); the imaginary world of the Great Mother – Mother Earth, for instance – appertaining to mythology and tradition, which intensively emerges in the anthropological experience of religion, rituals and clan-based communities.

Fachinelli was probably looking at the incest from an anthropological point of view. What is then - in anthropology - the interdiction of incest? It is the interdiction to marry strict relatives, it is not the prohibition to have sexual intercourse amongst relatives, although sex between relatives is not recommendable. Psychoanalysis and psychology confuse sexual practices among relatives - that of course can be considered abusive and illegal in a vast amount, or in all, communities and societies - with the interdiction of an Institution (Lévi-Strauss, 1969): the Institution of Marriage as legal act that brings
together two people in matrimony.

As Elisabeth Roudinesco (2010) claims, mentioning Johan Jacob Bachofen (1984), within the Oedipus Myth, the matter at hand is not that Oedipus desires Jocasta but rather that Oedipus is obliged to marry Jocasta as a consequence of his heroic enterprise of challenging and defeating the Sphinx. Within the Archaic Greek mythology, and later on in Greek tragedy, destiny (the Fatus) assumes the same role that in psychoanalysis is assumed by the unconscious; not within the Self, but in a communitarian sense. The terrible destiny reserved to Oedipus and Jocasta consists in their wedding. As a matter of fact, the community of Thebes - in the moment the wedding took place - did not know that Oedipus was Jocasta’s son, they were sure that an infant was killed to deliver Thebes from plagues and pestilences. Jocasta’s being mother to Oedipus was unknown. Furthermore, the terrible destiny that befell upon them was not the result of them engaging in sexual intercourse, but of their violation of a ceremony, a sacrilege. The psychoanalytical misunderstanding of the incest – in anthropological sense – the statement that incest is a sexual intercourse, and not a prohibited Institution, has been the main reason for banning the corporeal relationship and the rigidity of rules of Freudian analytical setting: the confusion of tongues between passion and tenderness (Ferenczi, 1994)

Fachinelli highlights the primacy of the relationship with the concrete other versus the primacy of the subject a manque a être (missing being). For Lacan the subject is constitutively dependent from the big Other – again the subject as $ - which consists in the structure of Language. Such a dependence is hence – in Lacan - structural, it consists in one and only one modality, the Subject who faces the Other, being the other (with the little o) just a flatus vocii inside the Self of the big Other. In Fachinelli the singularity is constitutive of the relationship with others who are beings, made of flesh and bones, endowed of differences, as roles (mother, father, friends, teachers, colleagues, even therapists), aspects (black, white, tall, fat, etc.), gender, attractive power, and so on.

Fachinelli deals with the relational approach; the missing being (le manque a être) is always a conatus toward the other and the relation to the other has its own specific, singular and minute aspects: relationships have different modalities (Bottirolli, 2023), the others are not the Other, the beings are always in relation, or – better – the relation is a primacy, and the beings – or the subjects – are “grammatical prejudices” historically conceived, and created within the Western culture.

**Fachinelli’s corporeal turn, back to Ferenczi**

Of course, Fachinelli was not the first one to re-evaluate the body in psychoanalysis. There have been many psychoanalysts who diverged from the psychoanalytical mainstream, reopening the issue of body language. For example, Jacob Levi Moreno (1947), the founder of psychodrama, or – in a different perspective - Wilhelm Reich (2023). Nonetheless the most important point of reference for Fachinelli was Sandor Ferenczi, and, indirectly, George Groddeck.

If we exclude Michael Balint (Dupont, 1995), who lately translated and edited Ferenczi’s Work in English, Fachinelli was one of the psychoanalysts who most contributed in raising appreciation for Ferenczi’s style of therapy and thought, very early and far before the more recent rediscovery of the Hungarian founder of psychoanalysis by some members of IPA.
In a brief essay titled “Il quinto privilegio dell’inconscio” (The fifth privilege of the unconscious), appeared in the Journal *L’erba voglio*, titled “Corpi e ultracorpi” (bodies and ultra-bodies) written in 1975, Fachinelli wrote about a footnote found in the Freud’s text *The Unconscious* (of 1915, now in Freud, 1960): “We are reserving for a different context the mention of another notable privilege of the Ucs”. [Ucs. stands for “unconscious”]. In the mentioned Journal - *L’erba voglio* – Fachinelli (1975b) mentions a letter written by Freud to Groddeck in June 5, 1917, where Freud writes: “In my essay on the Ucs., which you mention, you will find an inconspicuous note: ‘We are reserving for a different context the mention of another notable privilege of the Ucs.’ I will divulge to you what this note refers to: the assertion that the Ucs. exerts on somatic processes an influence of far greater plastic power than the conscious act ever can.” (Freud, 1960, p.133). The note, in the essay *The Unconscious*, is part of Freud’s larger grander work *Metapsychology*. Freud lists a number of qualities, characteristics, or privileges of the Unconscious - the Ucs. system, as Freud writes - such a list contains 4 elements:

1. within the Ucs. system the contradiction is absent; 
2. within the Ucs., it takes place the primary processes (what Freud in German calls *Besetzung*); 
3. Ucs. system is timeless - time does not go by; 
4. the Ucs. system substitutes the psychic reality to the external one.

For reasons of space, I cannot clarify the issue of the four privileges of the unconscious any further, in this article. More relevant to this essay is the fact that, in the mentioned text of *L’erba voglio*, Fachinelli observes that Freud expresses the possibility for a fifth privilege, which is considered - just en passant - by Freud in the above-mentioned note. Fachinelli hints that the matter concerning Freud’s footnote in *The Unconscious* is about the psychic influence on somatic processes. Here Fachinelli mentions Ferenczi and Groddeck, having the two – Ferenczi and Groddeck – exchanged some very important letters between 1921 and 1933 (Ferenczi, Groddeck, 2002). What is Fachinelli’s purpose in reminding Groddeck and, first of all, Ferenczi? Has it something to do with the above-mentioned gesture – the dorse of the hand under the chin – performed by the Italian analyst as a question posed to Lacan? And, above all, what is the main interest of Fachinelli concerning the body? Can we talk, acting in accordance to Fachinelli, about a corporeal turn in psychotherapy?

The working class

Fachinelli was not just a dissident psychoanalyst, he – as well as, for example Wilhelm Reich (2023) – was connecting psychoanalysis to Marxism. At the same time, he was also a critique towards Reich and to the biological Dialectic Materialism that, in Fachinelli’s view, characterizes Reich’s psychoanalysis.

Differently from Reich, Fachinelli proposed a vision of Marxism oriented to Historical Materialism. In Italy this difference was relevant during the 1960s, when a Marxist philosopher, by the name of Galvano Della Volpe (1967), inaugurated a new readership of Marx, particularly of the most important work of Marx: *Das Kapital* (Marx, 1992-1993). Della Volpe argues that Marx rejects Hegelian dialectical principles – namely, thesis-antithesis-synthesis – and applies the Galilean method to society. Della Volpe claims that, even though Marx and Engels have the same social engagement for
revolution, Marx’ philosophy is different from Engels’ one, particularly from what Engels refers to as the “Dialectic Materialism” (Reich, 1972, Fachinelli, 1974). More than a corporeal turn, Reich proposes a biological turn, that is the research for some hidden biological energetic mechanisms – the Orgon – that permeates the universe and the Ego as well. For Reich, all the causes of psychical diseases come from sexual repression and the way society, culture and religion contribute to it. In some way Reich’s proposal is a sexually liberated society as a way of eliminating any and all mental disorders.

Influenced by Della Volpe’s philosophical approach, Fachinelli’s intention is not to discover the materialistic structure of our sexual or instinctual conducts. Fachinelli shares, as well as other psychoanalysts – including Lacan -, the perspective of signification versus the drive (Trieb), or pulsion, perspective in psychoanalysis. Even though the unconscious is not “structured as a language”, as for Lacan, the unconscious is a system of meanings, where bodies matter.

Whether it is not Trieb or pulsion that moves the human being, what is Fachinelli’s approach toward the body? What does Fachinelli’s corporeal turn mean in psychoanalysis? At first glance, I would say that the body for Fachinelli is social, not biological. Fachinelli probably had Charlie Chaplin’s movie Modern Times (1936) in mind, the body envisaged by Fachinelli is the parceled body of the relationship between the manual worker and the machine at the assembly line, the fragmentation of the worker’s knowledge, who makes just a tiny part of the whole within the assemblage of the product. This is precisely what Marx (1992-1993) refers to as “alienation”, and for Jean-Paul Sartre and Hannah Arendt – although with differences between the two authors – turns into the Human Condition (Sartre, 1993, Arendt, 2018).

Based on what I can gather and assume by reading his work, Fachinelli was skeptical about the possibility of changing the world throughout a material revolution. He probably did not believe, neither in sexual liberation nor in a socialist revolution. In his written works, one can find irony and joy (Benvenuto, 1998), more than political certitude about the future; so, his social analysis about the human being, and workers’ alienation, shows the intention of creating a different psychotherapeutic setting of hospitality and welcoming, rather than a political enclave for militant activism. With this purpose in mind, Fachinelli agrees with the Ferenczian approach to therapy, the proposal to open a space for tenderness within the therapeutic relationship.

We shall now have a look at how Fachinelli’s proposal to connect working class analysis to the psychoanalytical setting actually applies. In Claustrofilia (Claustrophilia) (Fachinelli, 1983), another important book written by Fachinelli, the question that arises is: why is it that the working class cannot afford psychoanalytical sessions due to their high cost, and in a conference titled Il denaro dello psicoanalista (The money of the psychoanalyst) Fachinelli (1975c) poses also a disquisition toward the instinctual, or driven, approach to psychoanalysis: what are the analyst and the analyzed exchanging? Are they exchanging energies or are they exchanging meanings? If they are exchanging meanings, what is the meaning of the money going from the analyzed’s hands to the analyst’s. A typical Marxist question indeed.

In Claustrofilia the question posed by Fachinelli is what could the money transaction between the patient and the analyst, the compensation for the latter’s service, be called? Is it a honorary or a salary? Usually, this type of payment is called “honorarium”. Nonetheless, a honorarium is usually an amount of money given for honor; a one-time compensation for a service, as for example the work of an artist, or an artisanal job, like the work of a carpenter who makes the furniture for a
house. Salary on the other hand is referred to as the money given by a Master to a Servant – or a landlord to an employed worker. Salary derives from salt, as a matter of fact, during the Roman Empire salt was the good given as regular payment to the soldiers. Salary, is a set amount of money, a repetition, honorary is a one-time payment. Fachinelli’s conclusion is that, in psychoanalysis, the honorary paid by the analyzed to the analyst, rather than a honorary, seems to be a salary.

This action raises one philosophical issue: the Servant/Master Dialectic in Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Mind* (Hegel, 2003), where the analyst is the Servant – the one who provides the therapeutic service – and the Master is the analyzed. Nonetheless, in such a dialectic Master/Servant, Hegel, argues that the one who knows everything concerning the Master is the Servant, then, when time comes the Servant to abandon the Master, the Master’s destiny is death. But the Servant must go through a melancholic moment: the unhappy conscience. This aspect is practically treated in a clinical case concerning the closure of the analysis with a woman, and the dream she accounts, which announces Fachinelli’s irreversible and mortal illness (Fachinelli, 1989). The one who dies, in this Hegelian reversal of the story, is the Servant, which contrarily to Hegel's philosophy, is not the one supposed to know the Master’s desire, because there is not just one desire. Desire means an infinite multiplicity of different modalities of living a life, not only sexual desire.

**The therapeutic contract**

The second aspect of the repetition of the sessions – the following appointments - is that there is a contract – as in factory – stipulated at the beginning of the job, which provides the repetition of the same amount of money to be paid, no matter the income, average/variation, of the analyzed, or the possibility of losing one’s job and becoming so unemployed; from which comes the third aspect: psychoanalysis is a practice reserved to the upper-class people. In an essay dedicated to Freud (Fachinelli 2012), Fachinelli mentions that the father of the psychoanalysis plauded the decision made by the Emperor Joseph II, of offering free psychological assistance to all the people of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In “Il denaro dello psicoanalista” (The money of the psychoanalyst), in regards to the same polemical matter towards the instinctual psychoanalytic approach, Fachinelli irreverently compares the psychoanalyst with a prostitute. Both of them are engaged in a sexual service they give to the client in exchange for money. In this case, the critique toward the mainstream of psychoanalysis concerns the fact that, within the analytical session, the only allowed talking cure is sexuality and that any kind of psychopathology is originated from the conflict between sexual desire and the father’s prohibition of incest. In psychoanalysis one cannot even mention areas of life as work, religion, arts, or anything different from sexuality. Or, if the analyzed mentions other issues, they are just sexual sublimations, or acting-outs of the analytical frame. It is quite clear that Fachinelli’s thought is against the mainstream of what is referred to as Ego-Psychology, mainly followed within the Anglo-Saxon cultural areas, and particularly into the USA. Such Anna-Freudian approach has its reference in the English Standard Edition and translation of Freud’s Work, an enterprise conducted by James Strachey and Freud’s first biography by Ernest Jones.

The critique towards the instinctual/energetic approach to psychoanalysis has been shared by a wide amount of
psychoanalysts, Melanie Klein, Donald Winnicott, Wilfred Bion, Michael Balint and so on, and is, among others, also shared by Lacan. Fachinelli returns on the critique that Ferenczi (Dupont, 1995) expressed toward Freud, when Ferenczi accused Freud of using the patient as guinea pigs in order to verify the Oedipus model. The issue raised by Ferenczi, and later on by Fachinelli, seems to create the following outcome: “therapy is nothing else, if not the therapeutic relationship”. If this statement is of any value, then the corporeal turn is also a relational turn, and the entire therapeutical process is nothing else but transference and co-transference or, as Belgian systemic therapist Mony Elkaïm calls it: “resonance” between bodies (Elkaïm, 2004).

In his last book (Fachinelli, 1989) published the same year of his death, Fachinelli mentions Ferenczi’s proposal of using the body of the psychoanalyst to practice psychoanalysis. It is notorious that, in front of this position of Ferenczi (1994), the mainstream of psychoanalysts disagreed. It is also well known that the same Freud, in a letter to Ferenczi (Freud, Ferenczi, 1993), refuted Ferenczi’s proposal of using the body as a way of doing psychoanalysis. Still up to this day, the question of the setting, the habits and the rules of the analysis are an argument amongst psychoanalysts, one of the main issues was the controversy concerning the transference. Is transference a kind of defense mechanism – mainly seduction – or is it the most important aspect of the therapeutic relationship? The answer to this question depends on the point of view of the psychoanalyst. If transference is conceived as a seductive way, unconsciously used by the patient to deceive the analyst – a hysterical attempt to deviate from the cure – then transference must be avoided or treated as a defense mechanism and symptom, using counter-transference. If transference is conceived as the main aspect for creating the therapeutic relationship, then the co-transference (Orange, 1996) is an affective exchange between two beings – therapist and client – in a process of reciprocal analysis, just like Ferenczi stated.

It is quite clear that such a difference invites one to consider the consequences of one’s body use within the therapeutic relationship, and, as afore-mentioned, we have to distinguish two main approaches to therapy: the first – represented by the rigorous Lacanian and Freudian analysts – considering the body to be an obstacle; the second one – represented by Ferenczi and Relational therapists – considering the body to be a vehicle.

In this sense, the most rigorous application of Freudian analysis is the Lacanian cut; the decision, made by the analyst, to interrupt the session over a word uttered by the analyzer (analysant in French), the cut over the word that interrupts the session; which goes in parallel with the razor of the language that admits the subject into the Symbolic Order. Such a cut marks the missing being (manque a être) which is represented by the $ sign: the barred subject. However, who is the Other, concretely? Which connection does it have to the subject, which gender is her/him, which kind of ethnicity, knowledge, language, friendship, do they have in common? Who are they to one another? Is it the same, is it just a matter of neutrality? Or is it that the analyst’s desire is being positioning next to the analyzing’s to create the Freudian pair (Bollas, 2008)?

Following Ferenczi, Fachinelli reverses the therapeutic setting into a relational one, where the analyst is the other whom the person attending the therapy on whom the analyzed can somehow count. The setting becomes open to the possibility of exchanging hugs, caresses and gazes with tenderness, within a maternal enclave. Fallibility and reciprocity.
Footnotes

1 *L'erba voglio* was not only a publisher, it was also a title given to a book concerning a libertarian school for children founded by Fachinelli, Luisa Muraro and Lea Melandri (Fachinelli et al., 1971), as well, *L'erba voglio* was an experimental journal.

2 1969 was the year when *L'homme au magnetophone* was published as a book in France (Abrahams, 1976).

3 As a matter of fact, Lacan spoke French, and maybe someone in the audience did not understand clearly his discourse; maybe Lacan knew that Fachinelli spoke French as a native – Fachinelli’s family temporarily emigrated in France, when he was at the elementary school - and this is probably the reason for asking him to talk, to say something, maybe help the audience to understand more.

4 In the sense of inducing the analyst to the subject – Latin *se-ducere* – as a transferal action, or suggestion.

5 I am using, just in this passages on Freud’s work, the word Unconscious with capital letter, following the English translation of Freud’s Work.

6 About the adventures concerning the fifth privilege of the Unconscious in Freud, and why Freud abandoned the project of this kind of investigation, see Eizykman (2003)

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