

Review of: "Beyond the Luck Problem: Addressing Discrimination in Event-Causal Libertarianism"

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Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

The authors present a convincing argument for the consideration of neural indeterminism when determining moral responsibility.

One of the central arguments of the paper seems to be that using neural indeterminism to justify moral responsibility can lead to 'unjust discrimination'. It is not clear whether determining a moral judgement as unjust is also entirely free from neural indeterminism (that is, whether it is possible to objectively classify a moral judgement as unjust - which itself is a moral judgement - without conditional neural processes). This potential limitation could be further explored, in my opinion.

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