

# Review of: "Neuropsychanalysis and Dual-Aspect Monism"

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This paper is about a very interesting topic, but key aspects of the debate are not presented, debates in consciousness studies are not adequately framed, and the papers that are reviewed are not appropriate to the task that motivates the work. First, the author overlooks crucial sources of evidence for this very important question concerning the ontology of neuropsychanalysis. The author does not adequately read Panksepp (1998), which explains the motivation behind the term mindbrain. What the term refers to is in fact derived from Spinoza's notion of dual aspects of the same thing. This is also what William James meant by the term, those are the proper progenitors of the term. Secondly, there is a substantial discussion in consciousness studies about physicalism and dualism that the author does not take into account.

Unfortunately, the author leans on a popular work by David Chalmers, who at that time espoused a property dualism which relied on an insufficient characterization of the category of 'the physical' or material. What proponents of dual-aspect monism (DAM) would like to say is that we do not have a robust grasp of the nature of the physical such that we know its limitations. So the premise in the Chalmers argument that the author refers to forecloses possibilities that remain open both ontologically and epistemologically concerning the nature of matter. Thirdly, the case studies used are not the best examples of DAM, nor do they put themselves forward as such. The author should have a look at Mark Solms' book about consciousness, *The Hidden Spring*, in which he cashes out a sophisticated theory of dual aspect monism through neuropsychanalysis.